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 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
 Vol. 25, No. 1. February, 1984
 DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND THE REGULATED FIRM*
 BY RONALD R. BRAEUTIGAM AND JAMES P. QUIRK
 1. INTRODUCTION
 In this paper, we investigate the impact of demand uncertainty on the choice of
 plant capacity by a regulated firm. Over the past few years, demand uncertainty
 has become a major element in the decision-making of utilities, and particularly in
 their decision-making with respect to capacity choices. In a recent study by
 SRI [1977], it was reported that to maximize expected consumers' surplus, more
 generating capacity was required for the electric utility industry when operating
 under demand uncertainty than under demand certainty.1 This finding raises
 the question whether the structure of rate regulation of electric utilities provides
 the appropriate incentives for them to invest in more capacity under demand
 uncertainty then under certainty. The present paper addresses such questions.
 The model of the regulated firm that is employed in this paper derives from the
 work of Joskow [1974] concerning the recent history of rate regulation in the
 electric utility industry. Briefly, Joskow reported that during the 1960s and the
 early 1970s, the impetus for rate reviews in the electric utility industry came
 mainly from the utilities and not from the public utility commissions (PUC's).
 Joskow's findings are corroborated by data for the period 1948-1978. A study of
 all rate cases involving electric utilities in the U.S. for that period shows that of a
 total of 363 cases, 350 of these were instances of utility-initiated rate reviews and
 only 13 were cases of PUC-initiated reviews.2 From the point-of-view of the
 formal theory of the regulated firm, this strongly suggests that the Averch-Johnson
 model of a firm operating at or near an "allowed rate of return constraint"
 (with the allowed rate of return being in excess of the cost of capital to the firm)
 should be replaced by a model of price regulation in which attention is shifted to
 the "non-negativity of profits constraint", or, at least, this should be done with
 respect to the electric utility industry. With some elaborations, this is basically
 what we do in this paper, building on the approach adopted in a recent paper on a
 related topic.3
 * Manuscript received July 7, 1981; revised May 12, 1983.
 ** This research was supported in part under a DOE grant, EY-76-G-03-1305, EQL Block.
 We wish to thank Al Klevorick and Oscar Burt for their comments and suggestions, and the
 Environmental Quality Laboratory at Caltech for help and assistance in this research.
 I We should note that the SRI model differs from that of this paper. In particular, the
 SRI model permits brownouts and employs a fixed proportions technology.
 2 We are indebted to Donna Berry of Caltech for these data.
 See the data in Table 1 of this paper.
 I See Burness, Montgomery, and Quirk [1980].
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 2. A MODEL OF THE REGULATED FIRM
 We posit a regulatory environment in which the PUC adopts an average cost
 pricing rule, under which the goal of regulation is to set prices for the regulated
 firm so that the firm earns just the market rate of return (the cost of capital) on
 its assets. We will ignore the difficulties that arise in attempting to determine a
 measure of the cost of capital, or in deciding on just which assets qualify for
 incltision in the rate base of the firm and how they should be valued.
 Let q denote quantity demanded for the regulated firm and let P denote the
 price per unit of output. K is the value of the capital employed by the firm (taken
 to be the same as the rate base of the firm), and L is a measure of the variable
 inputs employed by the firm. r is the rental per dollar of capital for the firm, and
 w is the cost per unit of the variable input. Profits denoted by 2t, are given by
 (1) r= Pq-wL-rK.
 Ideally, to achieve its objective, the PUC would choose P so that 2r=0; that is,
 the PUC would act to set price equal to average cost. However, the PUC has
 neither the resources to engage in rate making on a continuous basis nor the
 incentive to do so. Following Joskow, we view the PUC as basically a passive
 agency, acting only when pressured to action. It acts to raise P when petitioned
 by a firm operating at a loss, and it acts to lower P when petitioned by consumer
 groups who can demonstrate that there are excessive profits on the part of the
 firm. Thus, regulatory review is triggered by either of two events:
 (2) t < O or 7 > sK.
 In this statement, s is some strictly positive rate of return sufficiently high so
 that the potential gains to consumer groups from rate review more than compensate
 for the organizational costs of putting together an effective intervention effort in
 the rate making process. s is not the "allowed rate of return" or the "fair rate
 of return" that is debated in regulatory hearings - the allowed or fair rate of
 return is r; the PUC engages in average cost pricing when it prices.4
 Because the PUC uses average cost pricing whenever it sets prices at a formal
 regulatory hearing, there are strong incentives for regulated firms to avoid PUC
 instituted rate reviews called in response to protests by consumer groups. In fact,
 it makes sense for the regulated firm to institute review proceedings to reduce
 output prices when it appears that profits at the existing prices will exceed sK.
 By so doing, it avoids a confrontation with intervenors and has a better chance of
 preserving profits above the cost of capital. In fact, the data on Tate hearings
 bear out this view of the regulatory process, as shown in Table 1.
 4 We will treat r as nonrandom, known, and fixed, to center attention on uncertainty in
 demand. To the extent that uncertainty about r enters into utility decision-making, the incentives
 for instituting rate reviews may be weakened.
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 TABLE 1
 RATE CASES, U.S. ELECTRIC UTILITIES, 1948-1977
 Company Initiated
 No. of Rate PUC
 Period Cases No. Rate Rate Initiated
 Increases Decreases No.
 1948-1952 46 45 42 3 1
 1953-1957 34 31 28 3 3
 1958-1962 43 39 38 1 4
 1963-1967 17 16 12 4 1
 1968-1972 104 100 96 4 4
 1973-1977 119 119 119
 Totals 363 350 335 15 13
 Source: These data were supplied by Donna Berry of Caltech, and are derived from
 Public Utility Reports.
 Note that PUC initiated rate reviews were relatively rare, even during the
 1948-1967 period when electric rates were falling for most of the country. In
 fact, Table 1 shows that company initiated reviews for rate decreases -while also
 rare - were more frequent than PUC initiated reviews. (All PUC initiated reviews
 were aimed at rate decreases). We should also point out that the steady fall in
 electric rates during the 1950s and 1960s -from an average rate of 2.77 cents per
 kwh in 1952 to a historic low of 2.10 cents per kwh in 1970- reflected in part
 "automatic" price decreases due to the declining block tariff structure of elec-
 tricity prices together with the operation of fuel cost pass through rules. As
 Joskow has noted, consumer groups are no doubt more concerned with the
 average cost of electricity than with profits of utilities. In a more sophisticated
 version of our model, s would be taken to be a function of P to reflect this concern.
 Briefly, our model of the regulatory process is one in which firms are the active
 participants and the PUC is passive. The firm petitions for a rate increase when
 profits are negative and receives an increase sufficient to achieve a zero profit level.
 The firm petitions for a rate decrease when profits exceed sK and receives a de-
 crease sufficient to achieve the level sK, thus avoiding a PUC initiated review that
 would reduce profits to zero.
 The model of this paper thus differs fundamentally from those employed in the
 traditional Averch-Johnson literature,5 and from those appearing in the more
 recent literature on demand uncertainty.6 We regard the regulated firm as
 subject to price regulation; the PUC (and not the firm) chooses the product price,
 in an environment in which both the non-negativity of profits constraint and a
 5 See for example, Averch and Johnson [1962], Bailey [1973], and Baumol and Klevorick
 [1970].
 6 See, for example, Pindyck [1981], Perrakis [Feb. 1976 and June 1976], Peles and Stein [1976],
 Rau [1979], Das [1980], and Bawa and Sibley [1980].
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 variant of the allowed rate of return constraint are relevant to the decision-
 making process of the utility. However, in recent years, it is certainly the non-
 negativity of profits, rather than the upper bound constraint, that has been bind-
 ing. Moreover, our interpretation of the upper bound constraint is quite different
 from that of the traditional A-J literature.
 To be explicit about both of these differences, consider an A-J approach applied
 to the case of a firm operating with certainty as to demand. The firm faces a
 given price set by the PUC, which is high enough to guarantee non-negative
 profits for the firm. Quantity is known once price is set. Then the regulated
 firm would choose its inputs, K and L, to maximize profit, subject to the upper
 bound on profits (ic < sK) that the firm wants to satisfy in order to avoid triggering
 a rate review.
 In the special case where the upper profit constraint is binding, then an A-J
 bias does occur.7 But this is only a special case, since the price set by regulators
 may not generally allow the firm to earn profits great enough to reach the upper
 constraint. If, at the existing regulatory price, 2t <sK for all choices of K and L,
 then the regulated firm will produce the required level of output in a cost mini-
 mizing fashion, i.e., it will operate on its efficient expansion path.
 When we turn to the case of unicertainty, things are somewhat more complicated.
 Peles and Stein [1976] analyze an A-J type firm, showing that under additive
 uncertainty affecting demand the regulated firm chooses a larger stock of capital
 than the unregulated monopolist. But, under multiplicative uncertainty, the
 closer the allowed rate of return is to the actual cost of capital, the smaller the
 stock of capital. Perrakis [February, 1976] employs a similar model to show
 that under uncertainty the regulated firm will operate with excess capacity for
 some levels of demand, and that ex ante expected profits are less than the maximum
 allowed by regulators. In a later paper, Perrakis [June, 1976] extends his results
 to show that generally the A-J effect does not hold under uncertainty for arbi-
 trary demand functions and probability distributions over disturbances, either in
 the case of risk neutral or risk averse firms. Pindyck [1980] presents a multi-
 period A-J model in which uncertainty again leads to ambiguity as to overcapi-
 talization of costs.
 The treatment to be presented here arrives at results similar to those sum-
 marized above; there is ambiguity about the relative capitalization levels under
 certainty and uncertainty and with respect to regulated and unregulated firms.
 But, the nature of the model leads to quite differ-ent explanations for the ambiguity.
 7 Formally, the firm operating under demand certainty will act to max wr, where wr=Pq-
 wL - rK, subject to r <sK, r <s < r,,, q = (K, L) is a quasiconcave production function, and
 rm is the unregulated monopoly rate of return. At an interior optimum, first order conditions
 are (a) P.K = -is/(1-A) + r and (b) POL = W, where O < i < 1. If the upper constraint is binding,
 2>O, and hence, an A-J bias exists since iK/V5L < rw. (Here it is 0 that must be concave in L,
 rather than revenue as in the traditional A -J literature.) If the regulator sets P so that con-
 straint is not binding, 2 =0 implies that 0 K/VI L =r/w, so that the firm is on the efficient expansion
 path.
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 In particular, if a regulated firm operating near the zero profit constraint faces an
 unexpectedly unfavorable demand or increase in costs, the firm can rely on the
 PUC to increase price to eliminate losses. Further, given a firm operating near
 the zero profit point, favorable demand or cost outcomes can lead to positive
 profits that, within limits, can be captured by the firm. Burness, Montgomery,
 and Quirk [1980] arrive at the conclusion that expected profit maximizing regu-
 lated firms tend to prefer risky (cost-plus) construction contracts for capital goods
 to safe (turnkey) contracts with the same expected cost.8 These incentives are
 reversed when the firm operates near the allowed rate of return level, as is assumed
 in A-J models. The data in Table 1 clearly show that any model that concentrates
 on the upper bound profit constraint has serious flaws when used to explain the
 behavior of regulated electric utilities in the 1960's and 1970's.
 The special features that characterize this model under demand uncertainty are
 taken up in the next section.
 3. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND THE CHOICE OF CAPACITY
 We next consider a decision-making environment for the firm in which demand
 is uncertain. The firm must choose its stock of capital K before demand is
 observed. It operates under a common carrier obligation so that output must be
 large enough to satisfy the quantity demanded. Thus, after demand is observed,
 the variable input L is chosen so as to satisfy the common carrier requirement.
 Let 4(K, L) denote the production function for the firm, where 0 is strictly quasi-
 concave with positive marginal products and with third order differentiability.
 Let x denote the values of a random variable that enters the demand function for
 output in a monotone increasing fashion, so that q = q(x, P) where a q aq
 Ox ap
 <0. Let f(x) be the pdf over x, while F(x) is the cumulative distribution
 function.
 Given P, theni once x is observed, q is determined as well. Then the firm must
 satisfy the common carrier requirement (3).
 (3) 4(K, L)=q.
 Since L is chosen after q is observed, in such a way as to satisfy (3), it follows that
 (4) L= L(q, K),
 where 4(K, L(q, K)) = q.
 Given the price P, the choice of capital K, the level of demand q, and the choice
 of the variable input L, profits for the firm are given by
 (5) m(p, K, q) = Pq - wL(q, K) - rK,
 8 This bias still persists when there are costs associated with the regulatory process, so long
 as these transactions costs are not so large as to preclude instituting rate reviews in the face of
 unfavorable outcomes. See proposition 5 of Burness, Montgomery, and Quirk [1980].
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 where q(x, P)=O(K, L(q, K)).
 We assume that regulatory price adjustment occurs instantaneously, i.e., we
 ignore regulatory lag. Let P0 be the initial price facing the firm. The firm
 chooses K to maximize expected profits before the random variable x is observed.
 Once x is observed, then the price is adjusted instantaneously by the following
 rule:
 P0, if 0 < mr(PO, K, q) < sK (no rate change)
 (6) P = P1 if 7r(PO, K, q) < 0 (firm seeks higher rate)
 P25 if 7c(PO, K, q) > sK (firm seeks lower rate).
 In (6), P1 is defined by 7r(P1, K, q(x, P1))=0 and P2 by 0(P2, K, q(x, P2))=sK.
 We assume that the regulated price is always set on an inelastic region of demand
 so that it is always possible to increase profits for the firm by increasing its price.
 Given K and P0, define qi(K, P0), i=0, 1, 2, 3, by
 r(PO, K, q?) = m(PO, K, q3) = 0, q3 > qo
 (7)
 m(PO, K, ql) -= (PO, K, q2) = sK, q2 > ql.
 Further, let xi(Po, K), i = 0, 1, 2, 3, be those values of x such that q? = q(xO, PO),
 q = q(xl, PO), q2 = q(X2, PO), and q3 = q(x3, PO). Figure 1 identifies these
 distinguished values of the qs, with 7t a maximum at q.




 SO 1 ~ 2 3
 eq q q q q q
 FIGURE 1
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 (8) -7 = P-w )
 where from (3), we have aL/aq =1/L where OL=ab/aL. Thus, 8m/8q >0 for
 q < q, ai/aq < 0 for q > q. Further,
 (9_2 =L a 2 LL < 0
 (9) ~ ~ ~~qaq 2
 assuming ILL = a24/aL2 <0, as we do.
 Finally, we assume that the firm is an expected profit maximizer, taking into
 account in its choice of capital the regulatory price adjustments summarized in (6).
 Then the problem of the firm becomes:
 max W = 5 m(P1, q(x, P1), K),f(x)dx
 K Jo
 (10) + 5| 7t(P0, q(x, PO), K)f(x)dx + X ir(P2, q(x, P2), K)f (x)dx
 rx3 cGo
 + 2 ic(Po, q(x, PO), K)f(x)dx + 7 (P1, q(x, Pl), K)f(x)dx.
 By the price adjustment rule (6), the first and last integrals are identically zero,
 while the third integral is simply sK[F(x2)-F(x1)]. Thus, the first order con-
 dition for maximizing Wmay be written as
 AK = |O7tK(Po, q(x, PO), K)f(x)dx + s[F(x2) - F(x')]
 (1 1)
 + 5 7t((P0, q(x, PO), K)f(x)dx = 0
 where 7CK= a7/aK and K is the optimal choice of K defined by a solution to (11).9
 In the work that follows, we will assume in addition that a regular max occurs,
 that is, 7KK < O?
 4. UNCERTAINTY AND THE A-J CAPITALIZATION BIAS
 In contrast to the choice of capital for the regulated firm according to (11), we
 might consider the choice of K and Lby an unregulated monopolist. Employing
 the same timing assumptions as above, the unregulated monopolist chooses K
 before x is known. After x is observed, the unregulated monopolist chooses P,
 which determines q, and then picks L to satisfy b(K, L) = q.
 9 In deriving (11), we use Leibnitz' rule, namely
 d Sy h (y, t) dt = -d- h(y, :) - hy, a)+ y (y, t) dt.
 dy a (w dy ' dy ~ Ja(y) dy
 Because the underlying ir function is continuous at the end points of the integrals, all terms of
 the form (d 3/dy)h(y, /3) and (da/dy)h(y, a) cancel out in (11).
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 Hence, after x is observed, we have the problem
 max Pq(x, P) - wL(q, K) - rK
 p
 with first order condition
 (12) Pqp + q-wLqqp = O,
 where qP=aq1aP, Lq=aL(q, K)/aq. Let P(K, x) denote the choice of P that
 satisfies (12), given K and x.
 The ex ante problem is
 max 5 [P(K, x)q(x, P) - wL(q, K) - rK]f(x)dx
 K - 00
 with the first order condition
 (13) 5 [qPK + PqPPK - wLqqpPK - WLK - r]f(x)dx = 0,
 where PK= aP(K, x)/aK, and LK =aL(q, K)/aK.
 Then (13) reduces to
 00
 (14) - w LKf(x)dx = r.
 _ 00
 We contrast (14) for the unregulated firm, with the first order condition for the
 regulated firm (15)
 -W 5 LKf (x)dx + LKf (x)dx} + s[F(x2 )-F(x 1)] =
 (15)
 r{F(xl) - F(xO) + F(x3) - F(x2)}
 where x? satisfies q(xO, Po)=q0, and similarly for xl, X2, x3.
 Clearly there is no unambiguous general result concerning an overcapitalization
 bias, independent of the functional forms off(x), 0, and q(x, P), and of the value
 of PO. In particular, as we have seen earlier, if PO is such that r(PO, x1, K)=sK
 for some K withf(x) a spike concentrating all probabilities at x1, then an A-J bias
 arises (assuming 0 is concave in L). And if max mr(PO, x, K) = 7r satisfies 0 < 7 < sK
 K
 for some x then there is no A-J bias when all probabilities are concentrated at
 that value of x. Indeterminacy of bias given the certainty case implies indeter-
 minancy under uncertainty.
 5. UNCERTAINTY AND PLANT SIZE
 Consider the profit function for the regulated firm, where we incorporate into
 the profit function the price adjustments that occur under the regulatory process
 (6). Let this function be denoted by r*(q, K). Then 7r*(q, K) is given by
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 [0 if q ? q0 or q? q3
 (16) 7m*(q, K)= 7z(PO q, K) if q?<q < qI or q2<q < q3
 LsK if ql?q < q2
 Figure 2 displays the 7t*(q, K) function. The marginal profitability of capital can
 be written as
 Jr*l
 sK - - - - - _-
 O 1 2 3
 q q q q q
 FIGURE 2
 0 if q < q? or q > q3
 (17) 7K - -L if q? < q < q1 or q2 < q < q3
 s if ql<q<q2
 where LK= - 1KIkL. Then it follows that
 0 if q < q? or q > q3orq' < q < q2
 (18) 7tKq=
 -wLKq if q? < q < ql or q2 < q < q3
 where LKq =3-(ILKL-K1LL)kkL
 In the general case, LKq is of indeterminate sign. However, if capital is a
 normal input, then LK <0 and the graph of 7rK as a function of q appears as in
 Figure 3. Over the ranges (qO, ql) and (q2, q3), ir is increasing. However, there
 is no presumption that the right and left-hand limits of 1rT evaluated at any switch-
 ing point (qO, ql, q2, q3) are equal. Thus, the jump discontinuities and general
 shape of the graph illustrate a "typical" situation so far as the 7T* function is
 concerned. Finally, we note that the curvature of the 7u* function over the
 intervals (qO, ql) and (q2, q3) depends on the sign of
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 g* i S I
 Jt I I I / Kl I I / I
 l I I / II I I 
 l I I I
 l ll I I I
 l I I I
 s I Ir ..I
 I I I I
 K I I I
 O 1 2 3
 q q q q q
 FIGURE 3
 (19) TCKqq = W(/LJKLL -K1L1LLL + 30KkLL L
 which is in general ambiguous.
 We are now in a position to compare the choice of capital by a regulated firm
 operating under uncertainty with its choice under certainty. As we have seen,
 under uncertainty, the firm chooses K k so that Wk=0, that is,
 Ef 7E(q, J) = 0 or wEfLk =
 Under certainty, with demand given by q-=Ef(q), the choice of the regulated
 firm is K=K such that 7r*(Ef(q; K), K)=0. By hypothesis, WKK<O (there is a
 regular max) and further, 7TKK <0 SO that TCKK <0 where it is defined. Thus, we
 have an unambiguous ordering over the amounts of capital chosen iff
 0 = 7k(Ef(q; K), K) < Efg*(q, K)< iK > K
 (20)
 or, O = 7r*(Ef(q; K), K) > Efg*(q, K) K < K.
 Figure 4 illustrates the case where k > K.
 By Jensen's Inequality, 7rc(Ef(q)) ? Ef1g(q) for all probability density functions
 f iff 7r is concave in q (and the inequality is reversed for all pdf's f iff 7T is convex
 in q). Since 7C*qq is generally ambiguous in sign over the intervals (qO, ql) and
 (q2, q3), and because of the other characteristics of 7r* as shown in Figure 3, we
 have the following proposition.
 PROPOSITION 1. The regulatedfirm operating under demand uncertainty may
 choose a level of capital greater than, less than, or equal to the amount it would
 choose under certainty. The relative amounts of capital chosen under certainty
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 FIGURE 4
 and uncertainty depend upon the specific properties of the production function
 and the probability densityfunction over quantity demanded.
 The interpretation of this proposition is best shown by reference to Fig. 3, which
 shows how the marginal profitability of capital (nt*) varies with quantity, which is
 uncertain. The regulatory system itself introduces discontinuities, so that 7T* will
 generally be neither concave nor convex in quantity, which is why it is generally not
 possible to rank the choices of capital under certainty and uncertainty.
 This raises the general question as to whether there are interesting conditions
 under which uncertainty has no effect on plant size. This occurs when given K1,
 the choice of capital under uncertainty, the probability density function is positive
 only over regions in which 7TKqq iS zero. Formally, let 40, q,2, q satisfy con-
 dition (7) given K = K. Let qL=inf {qI q = q(x, PO) with f(x) > O} and q1, and sup
 {q I q = q(x, PO) with f (x) > 0}.
 If the firm's probability density function over demand is such that q1,< 40 or
 qL> 43, then it is clear from inspection of Figure 2 and Figure 3 that profits are
 zero for every q such that q = q(x, PO) with f(x) >0 and 7Kqq iS zero for every such
 q as well. In these cases the choice of capital under certainty is indeterminate,
 since profits are zero for all possible choices of capital. Hence, there is no
 definite ordering over capacity choice (certainty versus uncertainty) in these cases.
 A more interesting possibility is that Ki will be selected by the firm such that
 41 < qL< q, ?< q2. In this case, the firm earns the maximum possible profits, sk,
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 for every q such that q = q(x, PO) with f(x) >0; further, 7C*qq is zero for all such q
 as indicated by Figure 3. Then by Jensen's Inequality we would have Ef(n*(q),
 K) = 7r*(Ef(q), K). Under these conditions, the firm chooses K( = K) as the largest
 value of K such that 7r(q, K) = sK for all q satisfying q = q(x, PO) with f(x)>0.
 Thus, the choice of K would be the same under certainty as under uncertainty.
 However, the argument fails because it can not be the case that 41 < < qLq ? q
 Proposition 2 shows why.
 PROPOSITION 2. The firm facing demand uncertainty never chooses a plant
 capacity K that guarantees the upper bound rate of return constraint (<sRK)
 will be binding for all q such that f(x)>0. The profit maximizing plant size
 will always be larger than any plant size that guarantees that the constraint will
 be binding for all q such that f>0.
 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Assume the contrary, i.e., at K, 41 < qL < qt? 72.
 Then by the first order condition (11) when demand is uncertain (i.e., x2>xI) we
 hav w _X2 have K = s(F(x)- F(x')) >0, and thus K cannot be optimal. Q. E. D.
 On reflection, this result is quite consistent with intuition. For at least an
 infinitesimal increase of K beyond K, the firm remains able to earn additional
 profits of s(K - K), with only a very small probability that the firm will not be
 able to operate on the maximum profit constraint. Thus, K cannot be an opti-
 mum. Expected profits can be increased by increasing the plant size.
 For purposes of comparison with Proposition 2, it is of interest to characterize
 somewhat more finely the choice of capacity by the regulated firm operating under
 certainty and subject to upper and lower constraints on profits. Proposition 3
 identifies certain basic properties of the choice of capacity.
 PROPOSITION 3. Given a regulated firin operating under demand certainty
 and with Tc(PO, Eq(P0), K)>O for some K, then (i) the firm never chooses K=
 K such that PO is changed; (ii) thefirmi selects K as the largest K such that
 TC(PO, Ep(Po), K) =sK, if such a choice is feasible, and (iii) if no K satisfies
 Tc(P0, Eq(P0), K) =sK, then the firm acts to minimize cost in satisfying the
 common carrier requirement at PO. (For proof see the Appendix.)
 This proposition is again quite in line with intuition. In a world of certainty,
 and with an inelastic demand, the firm would not want a lower price since that
 would reduce revenues, and more importantly, profits. A higher price is not
 desirable since the firm could only receive such a price if it would earn no super-
 normal profits at the higher price. Thus, the firm will operate to maximize
 profits given P0, and hence given revenues as well. Parts (ii) and (iii) of the
 proposition follow directly. The firm will want to select capital that permits it
 to operate on the maximum profit constraint if that is possible. If such a choice
 of capital is not possible, then profit maximization is equivalent to cost mini-
 mization since revenues are fixed.
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 The comparison of capacity choices by the regulated firm between the certainty
 and uncertainty cases is now complete. The firm facing demand uncertainty
 will not necessarily choose a larger plant capacity than it would in the uncertainty
 case. Under uncertainty, the firm does not choose a plant size that makes the
 upper constraint binding for all q that may be observed; under demand certainty,
 the firm will choose a capacity that makes the upper constraint binding where
 this is feasible, but it will not choose a plant size such that a change from P0
 occurs, so long as 7c(P0, Eq(P0), K)>O for some K. If m(P0, Eq(P0), K)<O for
 every K, then the choice of plant size is indeterminate, with every such choice
 leading to zero profits for the firm.
 It is clear from all that has been said so far that only under very special as-
 sumptions can anything definite be said about the amount of capacity that will
 be chosen under uncertainty relative to that chosen under certainty. A natural
 question would be whether there exists a set of sufficient conditions under which
 it is possible to order the levels of capacity chosen under certainty and uncertainty.
 Our examination of this question leads us to Proposition 4.
 PROPOSITION 4. Given any interval (q , qu), necessary and sufficient conditions
 that the choice of capital K under uncer-tainty be less (greater) than the choice
 of capital K under certainty for all probability density functions f(.) over
 the interval are
 (i) q o< qL < q < q4?' or qL < q? < q, anid
 (ii) 7r* be concave (convex) in q over the interval.
 Proposition 4 thus has the virtue of providing both necessary and sufficient
 conditions under which Ki and K can be ordered. It also indicates that only in
 the case when the regulated firm acts as an unregulated firm (i.e., no price ad-
 justments occur as the firm hits a regulatory floor or perceives pressure from the
 possibility of earning a return so high that a rate review would be triggered by
 interest groups) that we can say anything definite about the relative amounts of
 capital that would be installed under certainty and uncertainty.
 6. PREFERENCES BETWEEN CERTAINTY AND UNCERTAINTY
 One might ask whether a firm subject to the non-negativity of profits con-
 straint and the upper bound constraint on profits prefers certainty to uncertainty.
 We compare expected profits under demand uncertainty with profits under
 certainty given that demand is the expected value of demand under uncertainty.
 As above, let qL and q4 be the inf and sup of the values of q. Let K denote the
 level of capital that maximizes expected profits under uncertainty, and let K
 denote the level of capital that maximizes profits under certainty. Let q, 73
 denote the values of q?, q3, given P0 and K.
 Then, from Jensen's Inequality and Figure 2, we have:
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 PROPOSITION 5. Preferences of an expected profit maximizing firm between
 demand certainty and uncertainty depend on the subjective probability beliefs
 of thefirm with respect to demand. In particular,
 (i) if 4?<qL and q< 43, then the regulated firm prefers certainty to un-
 certainty;
 (ii) if qL<40 or 43<q q, then there exist probability density functions such
 that uncertainty is preferred to certainty, and there exist probability
 density functions such that this preference is reversed. (For proof, see the
 Appendix).
 A graphical explanation of this proposition can be provided with the aid of
 Figure 2. When condition (i) holds, the profit function g* is concave in q, which
 is uncertain. Hence, the firm prefers certainty to uncertainty. However, when
 (ii) holds, then 7r* is neither concave nor convex, and thus no ranking is possible.
 7. CONCLUSIONS
 Our analysis of the impact of demand uncertainty on the choice of plant ca-
 pacity by a regulated firm does not provide a definitive answer to the question:
 "Will the regulated firm choose more capacity when faced with demand un-
 certainty than it does when demand is certain?" Instead, generally the ranking
 of capacity choices depends upon the subjective probability distribution over
 demand and on the form of the demand and production functions. The same
 indeterminacy surfaces with respect to preferences of the regulated firm between
 demand certainty and uncertainty. However, certain characteristics of capacity
 choices under demand certainty and uncertainty can be identified; those are
 summarized in Propositions 2 and 3 above.
 The conclusions we have derived rest upon a model of the regulated firm that
 is based on Joskow's observations concerning the regulatory process, and in
 particular, on a model which recognizes the relevancy of non-negativity of profits
 as a constraint on the price-setting process. While the analysis assumes expected
 profit maximizing firms, the major conclusions concerning indeterminacy of pref-
 erences between uncertainty and certainty, and concerning the ranking of capacity
 choices, clearly extend to the case of risk averse firms as well.
 APPENDIX
 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. To establish (i), note that if 7r(P0, Eq(PO), K) >0
 for some K, then P is never increased, since P is increased only when the PUC
 acts, and when the PUC acts, profits are set equal to zero. In effect, the firm
 chooses K and P to maximize profits, where P=P0-P2, P>O. Formally, the
 firm solves the problem
 max 7r(P0 -P, Eq(P0 - P), K) R(Po -P) - wL(Eq(P0 - P), K) - rK
 (K, P)
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 subject to wL(Eq(P0 - P), K) + (s + r)K - R(Po-P) > 0, where R(Po -P) is
 revenue, that is, R(Po -P) = (P0 - P)Eq(P0 - P). The constraint states that
 profits cannot exceed sK. We form the Lagrangean H, with the multiplier A
 corresponding to the constraint. For simplicity, the arguments of R and L are
 suppressed. Thus,
 H = (R-wL-rK) + A(wL+(s+r)K-R).
 The first order conditions include the following at an interior optimum (K>0):
 HK -wLK- r + A(wLK? + (s + r)) = 0, and
 HP = RP- wLP + A(wLp - Rp) < 0, PHP = 0, P20.
 We wish to show that P=0. Assume the contrary so that P>0. Then Hp = 0
 implies that (1 - A)(Rp - wL) =0. LF >0 and Rp <0 since demand is inelastic.
 Thus, 1 -A = 0. But from HK = 0, this implies s = 0. This contradiction estab-
 ishes (i).
 It remains to establish (ii) and (iii). With P=0, revenue is fixed at R(PO) with
 output being Eq(P0). Suppose that the firm can minimize the cost of producing
 Eq(P0) without violating the upper bound constraint. If so, A=0 and the firm
 acts as an unconstrained profit maximizer given P0.
 On the other hand, if minimizing cost violates the upper bound constraint, the
 firm increases K to meet the constraint rather than change P0. Thus, (ii) and
 (iii) hold. Q. E. D.
 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. Because of possible jump discontinuities, it is not
 possible to rank KR and K for pdf's extending over intervals containing switching
 points. Further, over the intervals q < 40, q > q3, profits are zero for all choices to
 K, hence no ranking is possible. By Proposition 2, the choice of Ki such that
 41 < q < 42 is inconsistent with expected profit maximization. Hence, a necessary
 condition for ranking K and K is condition (i), while condition (ii) is necessary
 by Jensen's Inequality. When condition (i) holds, then the first order condition
 determining K is simply
 5: 7CK(PO, q(x, PO), K)f(x)dx = 0, or
 7: cK(PO, q(x, PO), K)f(x)dx = 0,
 x2
 which uniquely determines Ki, given TCKK <0 over the interval as has been assumed
 earlier. By Jensen's Inequality, the ranking between K and K is determined
 according to the concavity or convexity or 7TK in q.
 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. To prove (i), we use Jensen's Inequality and the fact
 that g* is concave in q on the interval (qL, q,,) given KI (see Figure 2). Thus,
 Ef(7*(q, K)) < 7*(Ef(q), K) < m*(Ef(q), K)
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 for all pdf's f. The first inequality is strict, since Proposition 2 shows that ql ?
 qL < q4 < q2 is not possible at K. The second inequality simply expresses the
 fact that K is the maximizer of profits under certainty.
 For (ii), we note that with qL < q? or q < q, the function 7t* is neither concave
 nor convex in q on (qL, qj), hence, no definite preference can be stated without
 knowledge of the specific properties of the production function, the pdf over
 demand, and the way in which demand responds to price.
 Northwestern University, U.S.A. and Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin.
 California Institute of Technology, U. S. A.
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